This is evident from the proceedings in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Indeed, the Commission itself does not consider its determinations the final answer to the meaning of the § 203(b)(6) exemption, even for administrative purposes.
Neither can this order be analogized to a declaratory order directed to the status of a particular carrier, which might be reviewable as carrying with it a direct threat of prosecution-see Rochester Telephone Corp. The specific determination that a particular carrier must comply with Commission regulations is quite different from this order, which is directed to no one in particular and is binding on no one, not even the Commission. As I understand that case, the touchstone of the decision was that the determination 'necessarily and immediately carried direction of obedience to previously formulated mandatory orders addressed generally to all carriers amenable to the Commission's authority.' 307 U.S. Nor can this order be likened to a determination of status, held reviewable in Rochester Telephone Corp. We conclude that the issues raised in the complaint are justiciable and that the District Court should adjudicate the merits. The Commission itself places this interpretation on its action and argues, contrary to its position in the Los Angeles case, supra, for finality of the order. The consequences we have summarized are not conjectural. § 1004(d), which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business will be done. The 'order' of the Commission is in substance a 'declaratory' one, see 60 Stat.
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A carrier authorized to carry specified commodities and dependent on exempt articles for its return load may lose its right to operate at all, if it does not respect the Commission's 'order.' Carriers and shippers alike are told that they are or are not free to bargain for rates, that they must or must not pay the filed charges. Carriers who are without the appropriate certificate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks. The 'order' of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. And wilful violation of a cease and desist order is ground for revocation of a certificate or permit. Such orders of the Commission are enforceable by the courts. Where unauthorized operations occur, the Commission may proceed administratively and issue a cease and desist order. The 'order' of the Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties. The determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well.
The United States as a defendant supports the Commission on some of its findings and opposes it on others. Other interveners are trucking associations and railroads which support the Commission. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened, supporting plaintiff's position on some of the commodities. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a common carrier by motor vehicle, holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity which authorizes it to transport certain commodities between designated points and places that plaintiff is transporting, in addition to those commodities, commodities which are exempt under § 203(b)(6) and for which plaintiff has sought no authority from the Commission that the Commission in its order has held the latter commodities nonexempt and accordingly has deprived it of the right granted by the statute that the order of the Commission classifying certain commodities as nonexempt is unlawful and that the Commission threatens to enjoin transportation of the commodities which plaintiff claims are exempt. § 2325, to enjoin the order of the Commission and have it set aside, naming the United States and the Commission as defendants.
Frozen Food Express, the plaintiff, is a motor carrier transporting numerous commodities which the Commission ruled were nonexempt under § 203(b)(6) but which the carrier claims are 'agricultural commodities.' Plaintiff, who was not a party to the administrative proceeding, instituted suit before a three-judge District Court, 28 U.S.C.
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